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1. INTRODUCTION
At one time Lower Sixth Avenue was one of the most fashionable retail centers
in Manhattan, but the area collapsed as a retail center when the affluent moved
further uptown and to the suburbs. Today, Sixth Avenue is in the midst of a rapid
turnaround, as reported in the Sunday New York Times by Claudia Deutsch (June
27, 1993):
After decades of catering to virtually no one save the odd buyer of a
quick lunch or piece of hardware, part of that once fashionable strip... is
again turning into a major retail area.
How can we account for the revitalization of this depressed area in the middle of
a recession?
The New York Times article provides an important clue. In 1992, Bed Bath
Sz Beyond opened Manhattan's first superstore in this area. It was the success of
this store that prompted other stores to move to the area. One local businessman
is quoted as stating that, "Sixth Avenue was dead as a doornail before, but Bed
Bath Sz Beyond has really opened it up," while another asserts that, "It was Bed
Bath Sz Beyond that really legitimized the neighborhood", The article goes on to
point out that the arrival of the store changed local rents: "Bed Bath Sz Beyond is
said to be paying in the low $20's a square foot. Barnes and Noble will be paying
in the $30's. Current negotiations in the area are inching towards $40."
There are two features of the Sixth Avenue experience that we wish to ex-
plain. The first is the long period of under-use, and the second is the rapid rise
in the area's prospects following the arrival and success of the first superstore.
In this paper we develop a search model to explore one possible explanation for
these events: information externalities. Before Bed Bath Sz Beyond set up shop,
all potential tenants faced the common problem of assessing whether or not New
Yorkers would be willing to shop on lower Sixth Avenue which is a rather in-
convenient location. The size of the crowds at Bed Bath Sz Beyond, however,
demonstrated to other retailers that many shoppers were indeed willing to make
the trip. This knowledge led to the snowball effect as other tenants rushed to lease
in the area.
We show that a simple search theoretic model with information spillovers
can indeed explain both the long vacant period and the rise in rents following
the success of Bed Bath Sz Beyond. The basic idea is as follows. The vacant
buildings on Sixth Avenue can be seen ELS options available for a wide variety of
alternative uses. Committing a vacant unit to any one of its possible uses is costly
to the owner, since such a commitment will normally involve modifying the unit
to fit the needs of the particular tenant. If owners can learn about the best use
for their property from the experience of neighboring properties, then they will
have an incentive to delay renting. They will all play a waiting game, hoping
that one of the other owners will be first to commit their property to a particular
use and thereby generate the socially valuable information concerning whether or
not the property is well matched to that use. Once a successful use is found the
uncommitted owners will be able to use the information to improve the quality of
their decisions.
One important feature of the model is that the delay until first occupancy
is suboptimally long. This is due to the information externality. When deciding
whether or not to accept a tenant, owners do not take into account the value
to others of the information revealed in their match. Owners are therefore too
selective in equilibrium. The model shows that the failure of optimality may be
extreme. We provide examples in which social optimality demands immediate
occupancy, but the market produces an arbitrarily long delay.
Another possible explanation for the sudden change in fortunes on Sixth Av-
enue is a crowd externality, in which later arrivals rushed in to take advantage of
the crowds generated by Bed Bath & Beyond.1 In this paper we also show how
to incorporate crowd externalities a search model, and show that they differ in
important ways from information externalities. In the crowd story the decisions
of the various landlords are complementary; if one accepts a tenant, then this
increase the size of the crowd and makes others more willing to accept tenants.
In the information story the decisions of the various landlords are strategic sub-
stitutes; if one landlord is accepting a tenant then the others have an incentive to
wait for the information revealed by this match. There is a big difference between
being a leader when your mere presence encourages others to follow, and being a
leader whose primary role is to warn others off making a similar mistake.
The model is suggestive of difficulties that may occur in many markets in
which there are changes over time in the optimal pattern of usage of given re-
sources, and in which there are costs of moving the resources between uses. We
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 The crowd externality story is implicit in many models of strategic complementarity, and
is discussed in detail by Rauch [1993] in the context of shopping malls.
believe that there are important analogies between vacancies in the property mar-
ket and unemployment in the labor market. In both cases, a valuable resource is
left unemployed for long periods of time, and in both cases we believe that there
is an important role for information externalities. This line of thought is further
developed in Caplin and Leahy [1993d].
To our knowledge, there are no other models of this form of information
externality in a search market.2 The most closely related work is a line of re-
search initiated by Zeira [1987] concerning the linkage between irreversibility of
investment and the process of learning and information transmission (see also
Rob [1991], Caplin and Leahy [1993a], Chamley and Gale [1992], and Caplin and
Leahy [1993b]). Other related models that stress the underproduction of informa-
tion in market equilibrium are due to Banerjee [1992], Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer
and Welch [1992], and Vives [1992].
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic search
model. Section 3 demonstrates existence and uniqueness of the solution, and Sec-
tion 4 explores the nature of this solution. In Section 5 we contrast the equilibrium
outcome with the socially optimal outcome. In Section 6, we present extensions
of the model to allow for recall of past offers, and to allow for different ownership
structures. We also discuss the impact of other changes in the model, including
the introduction of crowd externalities. Section 7 contains concluding remarks.
2. THE MODEL
Before the success of Bed Bath &; Beyond there appears to have been con-
siderable skepticism concerning shoppers' willingness to return to Sixth Avenue.
In the New York Times article, a local retail broker clearly states the grounds for
this early uncertainty concerning shoppers' attitudes,
Let's face it, on a sunny afternoon Fifth Avenue is bustling and Sixth is
deserted. Who knows to what extent bargain hunters will seek bargains
that cost a $20 round trip?
In this view, what Bed Bath Sz Beyond did was to take a chance, betting
that the traffic would turn out to be good. As the chief executive of Bed Bath Sz
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 Externalities in the matching technology in search models are covered by Diamond [1981].
The externality that may be caused by division of the surplus in matching models is covered by
Mortensen [1980].
Beyond put it, "Sure, we were worried about the lack of easy transportation and
the low street traffic. But we wanted the Manhattan market...so we took a shot".
When the store did indeed succeed, it revealed some important information about
shoppers' behavior to other potential tenants who had been waiting in the wings.
Other stores, such as Barnes and Noble, that had previously taken a wait and see
attitude, observed the crowds at Bed Bath Sz Beyond and decided themselves that
Sixth Avenue was a good place to do business.3
To model this phenomenon we begin with a set of vacant buildings, each with
distinct owners and several possible uses. For simplicity we assume that there
are N identical vacant buildings and that there are two potential uses for each
property.
Owners must decide for which use their property is best suited. We use
a search methodology to capture the time it takes for an owner to identify an
appropriate tenant. Specifically, we assume that in each period, each vacant unit
is visited by one and only one member of an ex ante homogeneous pool of potential
tenants. All of these tenants come from the first of the two possible uses for the
properties. This use corresponds to retail in the experience of Sixth Avenue. We
will discuss the alternative use below.
We assume that the quality of a tenant is revealed to both the tenant and the
owner of the unit during the visiting process. We denote the quality of a tenant by
a, which we take to be uniformly distributed over [0,1]. As detailed below, higher
tenant types are able to make better use of the vacant unit and will therefore be
able to pay higher rent. Once the tenant's type has been revealed to both landlord
and tenant, the landlord decides whether or not to make the tenant a take it or
leave it offer. Placing all of the market power in the landlord's hands removes the
potential externality arising from a division of the surplus and allows us to focus
on the effect of information spillovers. If the owner makes an offer then the tenant
occupies the building. If the owner decides to wait then the owner meets a new
potential tenant in the next period.
One essential ingredient of the model is a cost of transferring the buildings
between uses, so that keeping a unit vacant is preferable to committing it to
an arbitrary incorrect use. To capture the difficulty of transferring the building
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 In her article, Deutsch points out that Barnes and Noble had indeed backed out of a possible
deal in 1991.
between alternative uses, we make the extreme assumption that such transfers are
impossible. Once a tenant agrees to move into a building, they pay the agreed to
amount and occupy the property forever.
We assume that all tenants are risk neutral to simplify the landlord's problem
of assessing the amount that each tenant is willing to pay for the unit. This means
that landlords must work out the expected value of the payoff from occupancy to
each tenant type. Uncertainty concerning these payoffs arises from the ex ante
unknown market quality. This quality is captured by the parameter A which is
drawn from a fixed distribution. A influences the amount that each vacant property
is worth to all potential tenants from the first use. For simplicity we take it that A
is uniformly distributed on [0,2], and that the ex post payoff to a type a tenant in
a type A market is the product a A. The market factor has an equiproportionate
effect on the willingness to pay of all different a types, and is therefore a pure
common factor. To further simplify the landlords' problem, we initially assume
that there is no recall, so that landlords have only one chance to lease to each
potential tenant. The case with recall is taken up in Section 6.
It is the parameter A that plays the key role in the information transmission
process that corresponds to the uncertainty concerning shoppers' attitudes in the
case of Sixth Avenue. The critical assumption is that information can only be
released once a match is made; A remains unknown until after the first tenant
occupies a building and that tenants success can be judged. Specifically, we assume
that all participants in the market have access both to the terms of any occupancy
agreement between any landlord and tenant, as well as the actual level of payoff
that an occupied unit gives rise to. The observation of the amount the first tenant
pays to take occupancy will reveal the tenant's a type, while the observation of
the payoff will reveal the product aA and therefore pin down the market type.
Therefore in the period following the first match, A becomes public information,
so that there is no risk left and an a type is willing to pay precisely aX.
The last critical assumption is that each vacant unit has fixed value W > 0
in the alternative use. This assumption is needed to ensure that the information
on A is relevant not only to the payoff, but also to the optimal decisions of the
remaining tenants and landlords. We assume that at the beginning of each period,
each owner either gets to accept a new searcher, or immediately and irrevocably
accepts W to put the vacant unit into its outside use. What this means is that if A
turns out to be very low, all remaining units will be switched to the alternative use,
6while if it is high, the process of search will continue once A is revealed. In the case
of Sixth Avenue, the alternative potential uses for the space include apartments
(subject to zoning changes), storage, offices, and small scale retail outlets. In
order for the model to be interesting it must be the case that W is not so high
that search is never worthwhile. A sufficient condition for this is introduced in
Definition 2 in the next section. Finally, there is a discount factor 8 G (0,1) that
motivates owners to let out their property sooner rather than later, other things
equal.
Overall, the model accords with certain key features of the experience on Sixth
Avenue. There is a common factor that can only be revealed by the completion of
a match, just as the success of Bed Bath & Beyond taught other potential retail
tenants that crowds would show up. It is this ability to observe the success or
failure of an occupied unit and to make inferences concerning the payoff to other
units that is the distinctive feature of the model. The fact that the market factor is
fully revealed by the first match is special. Fortunately the major conclusions will
survive a great many changes in the microeconomic structure, provided only that
there is more than one property owner, and there is some common information
revealed after a match has been made.
As the above description makes clear, the informational assumptions in the
model imply that the market passes through two phases. In the first phase before
any units have occupants, there is no information on the market type, and the
owners must simply decide on an acceptance strategy: which a types to permit
to take occupancy for the payment of the amount o; itself (the ex ante expected
value to an o: type given that A is uniform on [0,2] and the payoff is aX). The
second phase begins in the period immediately after the first occupant has taken
up residency, and involves a known value of A. In this phase, there is a two fold
decision facing the owners of vacant units. First, given the new information on A,
is it best to continue searching or to collect Wl Second, if search is best, which a
types should be permitted to take occupancy at cost aA (the ex post value to an
a-type)?
In looking to the model for an answer to these questions, we limit attention
to equilibria in Markov strategies in which the decision rules of each agent depend
only on information that is directly payoff relevant. In this case a strategy for an
individual owner is a set of acceptable a types in the uninformed phase, a set of
A values that warrant continued search through potential occupants, and a set of
7acceptable a types corresponding to those values of A that imply continued search.
Given the information externality, the optimal strategies are interdependent, and
we look for a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
The simple nature of the search framework leads to simple strategies. It
is clear that any stationary equilibrium will involve cutoff rules: a reservation
type U in the uninformed phase, a cutoff level A, and a reservation type /(A) in
the informed phase contingent on the realized value of A. The Nash equilibrium
condition is that all decisions must be optimal given that others are using the
same decision rules. We summarize this equilibrium in Definition 1.
DEFINITION: The data of the model are the number of vacant units N > 2,
the outside use value W, and the discount factor 6 £ (0,1). An equilibrium of the
model consists a cutoff A £ [0,2], a cutoff U £ [0,1], and a function /(A): [A, 1] —>
[0,1] with the property that the following strategy is optimal for each landlord on
the assumption that all others are pursuing it:
(a) In the uninformed phase with A unknown, the landlord accepts the occupancy
of any tenant of type a > U upon payment of a, and rejects potential tenants
with a < U.
(b) In the informed phase in which A is known, the landlord sells the property for
W if A < A, and for values A > A the landlord allows search. When search is
allowed, the landlord accepts the occupancy of any tenant of type a > J(A)
upon payment of a\ and rejects potential tenants with a < I(X).
The existence and uniqueness of this equilibrium is demonstrated in Section 3,
and a qualitative analysis is provided in Section 4.
3. MODEL SOLUTION
We apply standard dynamic programming logic to solve the model. We begin
by solving for the optimal strategy of an informed landlord. Given that the actual
value of A is known, an owner can mechanically compute the optimal reservation
type /(A) using the known distribution of tenant valuations. Owners can then
compute A by comparing the value of this strategy to the value of the outside use.
Finally, knowing their optimal decisions in the informed phase, owners can decide
which offers to accept in the uninformed phase. This pins down U.
A. The Fully Informed Phase
To solve for /(A), we initially ignore the presence of the outside use at value
W. Let Vi(a, A) denote the value of an optimal strategy for an informed owner
who is visited by a potential tenant of type a and knows that the market type to
be A. By standard Bellman equation logic,
(3.1) V7(a, A) = max <a\, 6 f Vi(a\ \)da \ .
It is immediate from equation (3.1) that there exists a reservation level /(A) such
that the optimal strategy is to accept the tenant if a is above this level and to
reject if a is below. With this strategy the form of the value function is,
(3.2)
At a equal to J(A) the owner is indifferent between accepting the tenant and
continued search. We can use this indifference along with equations (3.1) and (3.2)
to solve for /(A),
(3.3). . A7(A) = 6 f Vj(a, \)da = f1 + ^\6
The first equality follows from indifference and equation (3.1). The second equality
follows from equation (3.2). Equation (3.3) has a natural interpretation: the left
hand side represents the value of accepting the marginal type /(A), while the right
hand side is the expected value of rejecting this type in the hope that a higher
type will show up.
It follows from equation (3.3) that /(A) = / is independent of A,
(3.4) 6 (1 + I2) = 27.
For any 6 G (0,1), it is clear that equation (3.4) has a unique solution for I E (0,1).
To see this solve for 6,
(3-5) 6=TTP'
Now the right hand side of equation (3.5) increases monotonically from zero to
one as / increases from zero to one. Hence the optimal level of / is continuous
and increasing in 6 and ranges over the entire open interval (0,1).
It will be convenient for what follows to treat the equilibrium level of I rather
than 8 as a parameter of the model, leaving 8 to be implicitly determined from
equation (3.5). We shall take this perspective for the remainder of this section.
Given /, it is a trivial matter to add the outside option and decide whether or
not an owner should continuing searching once A is known. The value of searching
is J Vf(a, X)da = A(1-^ ). This must be compared with W to decide the optimal
use. The property will be put over to the outside use if and only if A < A where
(3-6) A = J ^ .
With this the entire structure of the optimal decisions conditional on A being
known is clear. This allows us to step back into the prior phase in which A is still
unknown, and work out the optimal decision rule for these periods. Before doing
this, we first make an assumption on W that guarantees that the search problem is
non-trivial, in the sense that W is low enough to ensure that search is worthwhile
in the uninformed state. It turns out that in order to ensure this, it is enough to
assume that should the market turn out to take on its average quality, A = 1, then
the owner would prefer to allow search in the informed stage (this assumption is
sufficient but by no means necessary for initial search to be worthwhile, as we will
see below). What this means is that,
1W
(3.7) - i > A
 = _ _ = 2 t 0 .
Here we have introduced the transformation
W
(3.8)
 u, = _ _ 6 ( o , i / 2 ] 1
to further simplify the derivation of optimal strategies in the uninformed phase.
Note that the upper bound w < 1/2 would have been more complex to express
in terms of the original data W and 8, since changes in 8 change I and therefore
change the upper bound W(8). This is one of the reasons that this transformation
simplifies derivation of the solution to the model.
To summarize the analysis of the fully informed phase, we provide a listing
of the transformed data of the problem and of the corresponding solutions for the
equilibrium variables /(A) and A:
DEFINITION 2: The transformed data of the problem are N > 2, I G (0,1)
and w G (0,1/2], which give rise to unique equilibrium values X = 2w and /(A) = /
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on A E [A, 2]. The corresponding values of the original data given in Definition 1
are uniquely given by 8 = y^y? € (0,1) and W = w(l + I2).
B. The Uninformed Phase
Again we use dynamic programming logic to characterize the optimal decision
rule in the uninformed period. We begin by ignoring the option of immediate sale
for amount iu(l + / 2 ) . We show below that with w < 1/2, this option is dominated
by a strategy of search. We let Vu(oc) denote the value of an optimal strategy for
an owner who has a given searcher of type a in hand, but does not know the value
of A. The optimal decision is found by comparing the option of immediately filling
the vacancy for the amount a, the expected value of the property to the tenant
given that A is unknown, with what happens if the offer is rejected. Here there
are two possibilities. If no information is learned next period from the actions of
others, then there is a repeat of the uninformed problem: we let Pr(£Y) denote
the probability of this event, which will ultimately be determined in equilibrium.
Otherwise, the actions of others reveal A by the next period. This event has
probability Pr(J) = 1 - Pr(W).
We can express that Bellman equation in the uninformed phase as follows,
(3.9) Vu(pt) = max \ a, 8 . f Vu(a').da'
where EVj denotes the ex ante expected value at the start of next period of being
informed across the set of possible values of A. From our analysis of the informed
phase above, this expected value can be computed as,




Expanding the integral yields,
(3.10)
The condition for indifference between continuation and acceptance that de-
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fines the reservation acceptance level U is therefore,
Here the right hand side is a full specification of the expected return to turning
down an offer of U today: the first term is the discounted excess over U provided
no other tenant rents a property and the market remains uninformed, whereas the
second term is the value if the information comes out with EVi expanded as in
equation (3.10). The second equality follows from equation (3.5) which allows us
to replace 6 with a function of / .
To complete the characterization of Z7, we use the fact that this is a symmetric
Nash equilibrium to substitute Pr(£/). In a Nash equilibrium others are using
the same cutoff rule to accept or reject tenants. The condition for remaining
uninformed next period is that all other N — 1 landlords received draws below
U. This event has probability Pr(£/) = UN~1. With this substitution, our final
equation for U is,
(3.11) U = U»-1.1 ( j ~ ) + (1 - UN~l) .1. (1 + u-2) .
This completes the formal derivation of the model. We now establish existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
C. Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
We show that the model possesses a unique equilibrium for any / G (0,1),
w G (0,1/2], and N > 2 (corresponding to existence for any original data TV,
PROPOSITION 1: Consider any data N > 2, I £ (0,1) and w G (0,1/2) of
Definition 2. Corresponding to this, there exists a unique equilibrium of the form
given in Definition 1, with I(\) = I, X = 2w, and U G (/,min[l,(l + w2).I\)
uniquely determined by equation (3.11).
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PROOF: In order to establish existence and uniqueness of a solution we must
show that for any given values of / and w in the appropriate ranges, equation
(3.11) provides us with a unique solution for U G (0,1), which must have the
additional property that it makes initial search more valuable than immediate
sale. The condition for this is readily derived as,
1 -4- TT2
^ — >W = w(l + I2).
Since w < 1/2, this condition is satisfied provided U > I. Thus the demonstration
of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium comes down to a proof that equation
(3.11) has a unique solution U £ (/, 1).
To prove this we rewrite the equation as,
(3.12) Ai.U + AN-^U"-1 = Ao + AN+1.UN+1.
where Ai = 1 + /2 , AN_i = [(1 + w2)(l +12) - 1]/, Ao = (1 + w2).I.(l + / 2 ) , and
AJV+I = I- Note that Ao > 0 so that the right hand side of (3.12) is strictly higher
than the left hand side at U = 0. Note also that A\ + AN-I > AQ + AN+\ SO that
at U = 1, the left hand side is strictly higher than the right hand side. Since both
sides are continuous, this establishes existence of a solution U G (0,1). Once we
show that equation (3.12) has a unique solution, the fact that U > I itself follows
immediately from the observation that at U = I the left hand side of (3.12) is still
below the right hand side, and the fact that U < (1 + w2).I follows from the fact
that at U — (1 + w2).I the left hand side is above the right hand side.
The argument for uniqueness comes down to showing that the difference be-
tween the left and right hand sides in (3.12),
D(U) =A1.U + AN-LU"-1 -AO- AN+1.UN+\
is quasiconcave in U on the range U £ [0,1], ruling out two distinct zeros since it
starts below zero and ends above zero. To prove quasiconcavity, we show that at
any point U G [0,1] such that D'{U) = 0, the second derivative satisfies D"(U) <
0. Given that D'(U) = 0 we know,
0 = A1 + (N - I J A J V - I . ^ " 1 -(N + 1)AN+1.UN+1.
Differentiating again we find that,





The fact that the function is locally concave at any critical point implies that
it can have only one such critical point, completing the proof of quasiconcavity.
Q.E.D.
Note that in addition to providing the lower bound U > I, Proposition 1
demonstrates that there is an upper bound (1 + w2).I. The presence of such a
bound helps indicate the role of the outside value in the equation, and is also
useful in the comparative static discussion in the next section.
4. ANALYSIS OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
Theorem 1 indicates that the basic model conforms to the experience in the
Bed Bath & Beyond case. In the uninformed phase each vacant lot has probability
1 — U of accepting a tenant, and this event is independent across all lots. Thus
there is probability UN that all lots remain unfilled in any uninformed period, and
the expected time until the first unit is occupied is jzrjjw • Once the information
is out, the expected time until the next unit is occupied is jzrpT- The fact that
in the case of Sixth Avenue it took longer to fill the first vacancy than subsequent
vacancies has as its counterpart in the model the fact that U > I.
With regard to rental values, the model predicts an expected rent on the
initial unit of 1"t2t/ , while the expected rental on subsequent units should the
match be sufficiently successful to keep the lots in the given use is,
Theorem 1 demonstrates that U < (1 + w2).I so that,
l + U2 l + I2(l + 2w2 +w
2 - 2 "
The fact that w < 0.5 and / < 1 therefore ensures that the expected rental
increases provided the match is successful enough to maintain the buildings in their
original use. This was clearly the case in the setting of Sixth Avenue. Overall,
the model predicts the extended initial period of vacancies, and both the higher
rents and the increased speed with which lots were filled once Bed Bath Sz Beyond
succeeded.
The fundamental force that makes the model work is the information ex-
ternality. Each owner must decide between letting out their property early and
without the benefit of outside information, and instead waiting for the actions of
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another landlord-tenant pair to reveal the information to them. The possibility of
waiting for another's actions to provide valuable information gives rise to a free
rider problem. Landlords can only be induced to stop waiting if they believe that
there is a sufficiently low probability that anyone else will accept an offer and
hence reveal the information, and if they themselves have sufficiently attractive
offers in hand. It is these forces that ensure that the equilibrium level of U must
be higher than it would be in the absence of the information externality. Once the
information is out, there are no longer any interactions among the different vacant
units, and all landlords conduct privately optimal searches among the remaining
potential tenants.
The qualitative agreement between the model and the experience on Sixth
Avenue does not give any hints as to the economic significance of the results.
Among the questions to be answered are what happens in a large market? What
happens as the outside option gets more valuable? In answering these questions,
the main moral that can be derived from this section is that the delay till first
occupancy can remain very long even as the number of vacant units increases
without bound. This arises because of the potential severity of the free rider
problems that discourages the release of information.
The basic comparative static propositions are summarized in Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2: The equilibrium level of U is strictly increasing in w, and
is also strictly increasing in N.
PROOF: The proof of the proposition is straightforward, and is based on
analyzing equation (3.12). When w increases with N and / fixed the only effect
is to increase Ajv_! and AQ by precisely the same algebraic amount,
- i = AA0 = (Aw2 + 2w.Aw).I.(l -f I2) > 0
This means that if w is increased and U is left at the equilibrium value correspond-
ing to the old value of w then the left hand side will increase by AAN-I.UN~1
while the right hand side will increase by the larger amount AAo, so that the right
hand side will exceed the left hand side at the old value of U. Finally, this shows
that an increase in W will call for an increase in U to restore equality in equation
(3.12).
In a similar manner, the only places in which N shows up in equation (3.12)
are in the exponents UN~1 and JJN+1 respectively on the left and right hand sides
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of the equation. With U G (0,1), this means that an increase in N with U fixed
at its original equilibrium value shrinks the second term of both the left and right
hand sides by the same proportion. Therefore the left hand side shrinks more than
the right hand side provided the term AN-\.UN~1 exceeds the term AN+\.UN+1
in the old equilibrium. This is equivalent to the statement that A\.U is less than
or,
which is true as stated in Theorem 1. This implies when N is increased but U
is kept at the original equilibrium value, the left hand side of (3.12) falls below
the right hand side, so that in increase in U is required to restore equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
These results are intuitive. It is natural to expect that an increase in the
outside value will raise the payment needed to get an owner to commit to the
risky use, since it raises EVi, the amount that can be derived from just sitting
and waiting for the information to be revealed. Similarly an increase in N with
U fixed raises the probability that another agent would fill their vacancy this
period would increase. This increases the value of rejecting a current offer and
waiting for the information on the appropriate use of the property. Any force
that increases the value of rejecting a current offer must by definition raise the
minimum acceptable current offer, implying that U itself must rise with N.
The fact that U is increasing in N does not imply that the expected waiting
time till first occupancy,
 1_}us > remains significant. One of the interesting issues is
whether there are large markets in which there is still a significant delay till the first
vacancy is filled. If U were independent of N then we know that adding enough
vacancies would ultimately raise the probability of the information escaping in the
first period to the limiting value of 1. But it turns out that it is indeed possible
for real delay to survive in the limit, as U(N) rises toward 1 quickly enough to
preserve a strictly positive probability of the vacancy remaining unfilled for many
periods. The result is summarized in Proposition 3.
PROPOSITION 3: The limiting value ofU(N) as N increases depends on the
value of(l-\-w2).I:
(a) If (1 + w2).I < 1, then U(N) -> (1 + w2).I, and U(N)N -• 0.
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(b) If (1 + w2).I > 1, then J7(J\T) -> 1 and U(N)N -+ U, where
[(1 + w*)(l + i») - 2]./
PROOF: With Proposition 2 we know that U(N) is increasing in N, we know
that there is a limit as N increases, U = limjv-+oo U(N). If U < 1, then equation
(3.12) shows that U will satisfy,
(4.2) U = ^ = (1 + w*).I
For this to be valid, it must be the case that (1 + w2).I < 1.
In the remainder of the state space, it must be that U = 1. In this case
we know that as N increases, so UN~X -> UN+1 = U(N). Substitution in (3.12)
and rearrangement then shows that U(N) itself approaches a limit value, U =
fT= Ao-A1 = [(1+ w*)I - ! ] . ( ! + 1 2 )
A A [(1 + io2)(l + P) - 2]./
It is readily seen that this lies in the range [0,1] if and only if (1 + w2).I > 1. The
case with (1-{-W2).I = 1 is a cutoff case, with lim^ v—*-c» U = 1 but lim;v_*oo UN = 0.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 shows how severe the free rider problem can become. Note
that with w at its maximal value of 1/2, U approaches 1 as I increases to 1.
What this means is that one can find large markets in which the expected wait
till first occupancy, which heads toward —^ as TV increases, is arbitrarily long.
In contrast, in the next section we show that as N increases, the probability of
immediate information release always heads towards 1 in the socially optimal plan.
There is a good economic reason for the importance of the product (1 + w2).I
in determining the nature of the free rider problem in large markets. Equation
(3.10) computes the expected value of a vacant property at the beginning of a
period in which the information on A has just been revealed as EVj = (1 +
w2)(J~—). Viewed from the previous period, the expected value of a vacant
property should someone else's match reveal the true state is therefore,
(4.3)
where we use equation (3.5) to substitute for S.
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If S.EVi is above 1, then each landlord would prefer to wait for someone
else's actions to reveal the true state rather than accepting even the maximal
possible offer in the uninformed state. There can be no equilibrium in which
the information is practically guaranteed to come out, since this requires some
landlord to accept an offer of no higher than one, while guaranteeing an expected
payoff above one for anyone that turns down such an offer. This means that as
the number of firms increases, the probability of rejection must rise toward 1 fast
enough to maintain aggregate uncertainty concerning whether or not anyone else
will accept an offer.
In the following two sections, we provide further analysis of the free rider
problem. In the next section we characterize the socially optimal strategies and
show that in this case the optimal delay is zero in large enough markets. In Section
6 we extend the model to allow for recall of past offers, and show that this makes
the free rider problem even more extreme. The possibility of recall greatly reduces
the sacrifice to turning down an offer, and therefore makes it all the harder to
induce an information revealing acceptance.
5. THE SOCIAL PLANNER'S PROBLEM
In this section we show that a social planner subject to the same informa-
tional constraints as the private market will face a greater incentive to accept an
offer in the first period. The reason is simply that the planner internalizes the
informational externality that the private market ignores. Derivation of the social
optimum is simplified by noting that there are no externalities that remain once
the information on A has been released. The solution to the social planner's prob-
lem comes down to specifying optimal acceptance rules for the periods before A
has been revealed.
We consider a social planner setting a reservation cutoff level in the unin-
formed period, i?, that is the same for all units. The per unit expected surplus
generated by such a strategy can be written as W(R),
W(R) = R[(l - RN~1)6EVI + RF-iSWiR)] * ~ R
which can be rearranged to,
(5 1) W(R) =
2(1 -
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The first two terms record the fact that if the individual unit receives an offer below
i?, then it is currently worth EVj at the start of next period if the information is
revealed next period, which has probability 1 — RN~1, and otherwise it is worth
W(R) at the start of next period. The final term reflects the surplus that arises if
an offer above R is received. The social planner's goal is to pick the value R = S
that maximizes W(R). We show that the social planner's solution is always below
the level U set in the market equilibrium. In addition we show that in contrast
to the market solution, the social planner will always set a strategy that ensures
that the probability that the information is released in the first period approaches
1 as the market increases in size.
PROPOSITION 4: A social planner picking the level of the uninformed reser-
vation type to maximize the level of expected surplus given in equation (5.1) will
always pick a level S < U. In addition, as N increases, the probability that the
information will be released in the first period increases to 1 in the solution to the
social planner's problem.
PROOF: The first order condition for the social planner's problem is,
(5.2) S = (1 - NSN~1).SEVI + N.SN~1.6W(S).
In contrast, we can express the first order condition for a single agent's optimal
choice in the private Nash equilibrium (the equation for the reservation wage) in
the form,
(5.3) U = (l- UN-l)8EV! + UN-\8W(U).
The difference is that the social planner does not take the other values of the
cutoff rules as given in their optimization problem. The solution for the Nash
equilibrium is a value of U that satisfies equation (5.3) with W(U) as defined in
equation (5.1). The solution for S satisfies equation (5.2) again with W(U) defined
as in equation (5.1).
We use equation (5.3) to show S < U. Note that at U = 0 the right hand
side is SEVi which exceeds the left hand side. At U = 1, the right hand side is
W(l) = 0, which is below the left hand side. Proposition 1 shows that there is a
unique equilibrium and thus a unique point of equality in (5.3). This means that
we can show S < U by showing that the right hand side is still above the left hand
19
side at S. To see that this is indeed so, let S solve the social planner's problem.
The first order condition (5.2) can be rearranged to,
S + S(N - l J . S " " 1 ^ / - W(S)] = (1 - SN-1).8EVI + SN~1.SW(S).
Note that EVj > W(S) since it is better to be informed than uninformed. This
means that in terms of equation (5.3), the right hand side evaluated at S exceeds
the left hand side, so that S <U.
We now consider whether it is possible for SN to head to a limit other than
zero as TV increases. This is clearly impossible if 6EVj < 1, since the average
welfare functional (5.1) is diminishing for cutoff levels above SEVj. Suppose that
SEVi > 1 and that S heads toward 1 so fast that SN has a subsequence heading
to a limit L > 0. In this case substitution in equation (5.1) shows that welfare per
unit heads to the limit £,
C - fr-fl 6EV,
Against this, consider the (suboptimal) strategy of fixing S = 1 — a for a fixed
small value of a > 0. In this case the average welfare heads to the limit C(a)
identified from (5.1) as,
C(a) =
With a = 1 — (-[Jg A 6 (0,1) the alternative strategy dominates, so that the limit
probability SN is zero if optimal strategies are pursued. Q.E.D.
It is the case of a large market that reveals just how poorly the market may
handle information externalities. In intuitive terms, it is clear that increasing the
number of vacant units raises the social value of the information on A, since it
linearly increases the amount that is learned. In contrast, Proposition 3 shows
that with (1 + w2).I > 1, the minimal offer acceptable in the market heads toward
1 at a rapid enough rate to maintain aggregate uncertainty concerning whether
or not an offer will be accepted. The failure of optimality is dramatic in large
markets.
6. EXTENSIONS
In this section we consider a number of extensions to the basic model. We
begin by adding a formal analysis of recall to the basic search model, and show that
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this merely increases the power of the information externality to distort market
outcomes. We then analyze the effects of changing the ownership structure. We
also consider the qualitative impact of changing the information structure and the
nature of the payoffs. Finally, we show how to introduce crowd effects into the
model.
A. Recall in the Search Market
The behavior of Barnes and Noble indicates that the vacant property market
on Sixth Avenue is more appropriately modeled as allowing for recall. Barnes
and Noble decided against taking a lease in 1991, but changed its mind once it
saw the crowds at Bed Bath Sz Beyond. To allow for recall, we amend the model
by assuming that in any period each landlord can both get a new offer, and also
recall any previous offer. The effect that this has on the optimal strategy in the
fully informed phase is straightforward. With recall, let M be the maximum of
the past offers received by an owner once A is revealed: that is the maximum
of the a types that has visited a particular vacant location. If M is below the
fully informed reservation cutoff type / then it is irrelevant to optimal decision
making. Otherwise the optimal strategy will be to sell immediately for W unless
the option of taking either M or the first type (if higher) dominates: that is unless
1W
We can use this to solve for the optimal strategy in the uninformed period.
In the uninformed period it is natural to look for some reservation type R> U
and to accept offers of above R and reject offers below. Given our knowledge of the
optimal strategy once the truth has been revealed, we can write the indifference
condition between acceptance and rejection of an offer in the uninformed phase
as,
(6.2) R =
The right hand side of (6.2) records the expected value if the offer of R is turned
down while others use this cutoff rule. The first term on the right hand side repre-
sents the probability that no information is revealed by any of the others multiplied
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by the expected value of remaining uninformed next period, while the second rep-
resents the expected value if the information does become public multiplied by the
probability of that event. Equation (6.2) can be simplified to,
(6.3) 2R = 6(1 + R2) + Sw(l - i ^ " 1 ) ,
where we have introduced
(6-4) » = j ^ < 1/2.
It is convenient to treat w £ (0,1/2) rather than W as the datum. This can be
justified by noting that the value of R that solves (6.3) is increasing in w, so that
there is a unique value of W = w(l -f R2) that corresponds to any given value of
w, S and N.
Equation (6.3) can be analyzed in an almost identical manner to equation
(3.11) for the reservation cutoff with no recall. It is straightforward to show
that equation (6.3) has a unique solution R € (U, 1), and that there is a unique
equilibrium in which in the uninformed phase, any landlord accepts a type a
tenant if and only if a > R. Once the information has been revealed, any landlord
with maximal offer M > I allows in one more searcher and accepts the maximum
offer between the old and new searcher, provided (6.1) is valid. For a searcher
with maximal offer below / , the optimal strategy once the information has been
revealed is identical to the optimal strategy in the case without recall.
This solution is very similar to the solution to the model without recall. The
main difference lies in the fact that recall makes the free rider problem even more
severe. This is because it greatly reduces the pressure to accept a high current
offer in the uninformed phase, since there is the option of getting the same offer
back again in the following period. The most graphic illustration of the increased
severity of the free rider problem is seen by examining the behavior of RN as
N increases. It is readily seen from an examination of equation (6.3) that the
sequence of non-revelation probabilities RN heads to a limit R if and only if





The reason for the role of the difference between w and (^y^) in determining
the limit behavior of the probability of non-revelation is exactly analogous to the
reasoning in the case without recall. The key question is whether an owner would
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prefer to accept an offer of 1, or delay till next period with the offer in hand and
be assured of learning the value of A. Consider an individual with an offer of 1
in hand deciding whether to delay or not. If they believe that the information is
sure to come out next period, then they will have a return of 6. max[W, A] if they
wait till next period, which has an expected value of £(1 -f -^-). This exceeds 1
if S^r- > 1 — 6, and in these cases there can be no equilibrium with immediate
revelation. In such cases, we know that the value of R heads to 1, so that - j -
approaches w, and the condition for limit delay involves the comparison between
w and i j ^ noted above.
A numerical example show how severe the free rider problem can be in the
case with recall. Suppose that it takes one year for a tenant to arrive at terms
with a landlord, open their store, and have others gauge its level of success. This
means that the relevant period length is one year. Suppose also that the discount
factor is 6 = 0.9 so that the interest rate is roughly 10% per annum, and that
w « 0.5 (corresponding to a relatively high value in the outside use). In this case
the limit of equation (6.5) is valid, and with a large number of vacant stores, the
probability that none of them will be filled in the first year is R = 7/9. This means
that the expected time until the information becomes public is 4.5 years, while
social optimality would call for the information to be made public in the minimum
possible time of 1 year.
B. Ownership Structure
An important class of extensions involves allowing for alternative ownership
structures. To understand why this is so important, note that a monopoly owner
of all vacancies would be able to radically improve the functioning of the market by
looking at the entire set of offers for the different units and accepting the best one
in order to both release the information early and reduce the amount of wastage
associated with committing units to the incorrect use. In this sense the monopolist
has an advantage even over the social planner considered in the last section, who
had to take into account the informational constraints arising from the assumed
lack of direct communication between competitive landlords.
To understand the monopolist's optimal strategy, note that once the informa-
tion has been released, the monopolist would follow exactly the same strategy as
the competitive market. The difference occurs in the uninformed phase. Provided
at least one offer is accepted during the period, equation (4.3) provides us with
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the current expected value of any that are unfilled as S.EVi = (1 -f- w2).I This
makes it intuitive that any offers above this should be accepted. The only issue is
whether the maximum offer should still be accepted, even if it is below this level?
The answer is yes if and only if the maximal offer exceeds some lower bound M.
The entire issue of computing the monopoly optimum reduces to the identification
of M. We compute M for the relatively simple case in which (1 -f w2).I > 1 so
that only one offer is ever accepted.
In this case we can solve for the socially optimal cutoff rule by comparing
the value of accepting M, which has expected value M + (N — 1)(1 -f if2)./, with
rejection which has current expected value of E, which can be computed using the
fact that the distribution of the maximum is G(H) = HN,
S[(N> - !),(! 4- ™2)./(l - MN) + N.(l - M"**)]
( 6
-
6 ) E =
 (N +1)(1 - SM") '
With equation (6.6), we know that the condition for M G (0,1) to be an
optimal cutoff is that it give rise to indifference between acceptance and rejection
given continued use of the rule,
2
 ( V N N.(\ -
» ) . / = (JV
Rearrangement yields the indifference condition,
(6.7) (N + 1).M + (N2 - 1)(1 + w2)J(l -6) = 6N + 6MN+1.
The only other possibility is that acceptance always dominates rejection even with
an arbitrarily small offer in hand. The condition for this is,
(6.8) (AT2 - 1 ) ( 1 + w2).I(l ~6)> 6N,
where inequality (6.8) arises from substituting M = 0 in equation (6.7), and noting
that the left hand side represents acceptance.
We can characterize the monopoly policy as setting M = 0 if inequality (6.8)
does hold and otherwise setting M as the unique solution M G (0,1) to equation
(6.7). With this characterization, it is straightforward to show that M < I by
noting that at the point M = I the right hand side of (6.8) surely already exceeds
the left hand side. The reason that M < I is that the information externality
implies that the monopolist has an additional reason to allow a match to take
place early: it reveals valuable information. Because matches create information
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that is valuable to other searchers, the monopolist accepts a tenant more readily
than they would if they owned a single unit.
The monopoly optimum also has very different comparative static properties
from the competitive outcome. Consider the effects of an increase in the outside
value W, with 6 and N fixed. In economic terms, this makes the information on
A more valuable, since the outside use is more attractive. As we have seen, this
makes competitive private agents less willing to accept an offer in the uninformed
phase, since they are made to give up an increasingly valuable option. But for
the monopolist, the increased value of all vacant units makes it more important
to release information early so that the proper use can be found for the vacancies.
This suggests that an increase in W should lower M, and this is indeed the case.
This is readily seen for the case (1 -f w2).I > 1 analyzed above, since the only
effect of an increase in W is to increase the left hand side of (6.7) and therefore
call for a reduction in the minimally acceptable offer.
It is not surprising that where information externalities are important, there
are certain advantages to monopoly ownership. The shopping malls that have
sprung up in so many places indicate that these incentives have not gone unnoticed
in the market. It is common for mall owners to offer good rates to certain key
stores, both to provide the stamp of approval for the economic potential of the
mall, and also to attract the crowds for the other stores that may arrive later.
The case with competitive owners appears more likely to characterize areas
that are long established and have seen multiple uses, such as Sixth Avenue. In
complex urban settings, the nature of the correlations between payoffs at different
locations changes over time, and so the relevant peer group also changes. This
means that absent monopoly ownership of the entire city, it is very likely that any
new developments will cut across units that have different owners. This does not
mean that there will not be efforts at consolidation and take-over once the common
interest is noticed, but there is no evidence that such a process can take place
without itself involving the expenditure of considerable time and effort. There are
historical forces that may make the various owners more than a little suspicious in
the face of a takeover bid that they can trace to a competitor. However this may
be, the model points to the importance of ownership structure in determining the
speed with which large numbers of vacant spaces get filled up.
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C. Information Technology and Payoff Structure
There are several conceptually straightforward amendments to the model that
would reduce the extent of the information externality without fundamentally
changing the message. If the payoffs at the various locations were less than per-
fectly correlated, then there would be less to be gained by waiting for another
store's results. If there was a smaller cost of switching the unit among its various
uses, then the loss caused by an incorrect decision would fall, and this would also
reduce the free rider problem.
There are other changes that may operate to worsen the problem. One of these
is the additional externality introduced when there are crowd spillover effects. As
we show in the next section, this also tends to give rise to a suboptimal delay in
filling the first vacant unit. Another such change would involve endogenizing the
extent of the search effort. In this case the presence of other searchers would slow
down the privately optimal search speed. Information is a public good and would
be underprovided by private agents. The reduction in search speed would add
another force tending to delay information revelation , especially in large markets.
Another set of issues arise in considering changes in the information structure.
There are many ways to change the information flow that all end up reducing the
extent of the learning that takes place from a single observation of a store's success.
One way to assure this is to make the reasonable assumption that observations
of rents and profitability are highly noisy. One could also imagine changing the
structure of information and the protocol in individual bargains in a manner that
would impede the flow of information among agents. While these amendments
should be expected to reduce the extent of the discontinuity in market outcomes,
there is little reason to believe that this would change the fundamental form of
the externality.
D. Crowd Effects
We now amend the model to allow for crowd spillover effects. To keep things
simple, we get rid of the information spillover. To capture the crowd effects in the
simplest possible manner, we assume that the payoff to an a type in any period is
a(l — S) while there are no other units occupied, and rises to X.a(l — 6) per period
as soon as there is a single other unit occupied, with A > 1. This means that one
store alone does not draw the crowd, but that the presence of two stores draws
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in the whole crowd. In all other respects we retain an identical model structure,
although there is no role for the outside option W.
In this framework just as in the model of information spillovers, there is a two
phase market history. In the first phase before any units have occupants, there is
uncertainty concerning the timing of arrivals in the market and when the external
economy will be in place. In the second phase, once a vacant unit is occupied,
any later arrivals know that they will benefit from the full crowd spillover. Again
equilibrium is given by reservation types C with none occupied and I once one
or more unit is occupied. The model is identical to the information model in
the second phase, so that the second cutoff is the familiar value of / identified in
equation (3.5) above.
To calculate C we use the condition for indifference between acceptance and
rejection. Note that both of these values are endogenous to the model and depend
on the equilibrium strategies themselves. To see how much to charge an a type
with no other occupants in place, the landlord must compute the expected present
value of occupancy for this a type: it will be above a but below a. A. The expected
surplus to an a type who takes occupancy in a period with no prior occupants
depends both on the probability that some other unit gets occupied in this period,
and the probability that units get occupied in subsequent periods. Hence the value
depends on both C and /: the value can be written as a.K(C), where a little
algebra shows,
(6.9) K(C) = A - (A ( 1 ^ )
Note that K(0) = A.
To make the optimal decision, one must compare the value of accepting the
a type to the value of rejecting. If the offer is rejected then the following period
involves either a repeat of the case with zero occupants, in which case the expected
value as of the start of next period is K.(^~). If another unit has been occupied
the expected value at the start of the next period is A^1"^ ). A little further
manipulation yields the indifference condition as between accepting and rejecting
the offer in the uninformed stage as,
(6.10) C.K(C)(1 + I2) - CN~1I(1 + C2)K(C) + (1 - CN~1)J(1 + J2).A.
Equations (6.9) and (6.10) are the final equations to determine C and K(C).
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It is straightforward to establish that an equilibrium exists, and that any
solutions satisfy C > J, but K.C < X.I and K.(l + C2) < A.(l + I2). This
means that the crowd story fits the same qualitative aspects. But there is a big
difference, in that the crowd effect is in many ways less strong. In economic
terms the reason for this is that the cost of leading is far higher in the model
of information externalities, in which entry may be a permanent mistake. One
reflection of this difference between the information model and the crowd model is
shown by considering what happens as the number of vacancies grows. In contrast
to the information story, in the crowd story the problem tends to disappear in a
large market.
PROPOSITION 5: In large markets as N heads to infinity, any sequence of
equilibria, C(N) head toward I.
PROOF: The result hinges on an analysis of equation (6.10). We first show
that the sequence C(N)N heads to zero. Suppose that there is a convergent
subsequence of the C(N)N that head to some limit C that is strictly above zero.
In this case the left hand side of (6.10) heads to A(l + 72), while the right hand
side heads to XI.[2C -f (1 — C)(l +12)]. A little rearrangement shows that for this
equality to hold requires,
(1 + I2) = 7(1 + J).C,
which is impossible since the right hand side is strictly below J.-f I2.
Since C(N) heads toward zero, equation (6.9) implies that K(C(N)) heads
toward A as N increases. Now consider a sequence C(N) that converge to some
limit C E [0,1]. Substitution in (6.10) then yields,
so that C = I as claimed. Q.E.D.
The reason that Proposition 5 is valid is that with crowd spillovers, the more
you trust someone else to accept a tenant, the more you wish to accept a tenant
yourself. The. acceptance decisions of the various landlords are complementary.
In a large market, if all tenants of type a > I are allowed in even before there
are any tenants in place, the probability that another space will be filled rises to
1. There is no need to wait, because one is almost guaranteed that enough stores
will arrive to get a crowd in the very first period. The more general issue is that
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while a large number of players may help to resolve the crowd externality problem,
large numbers play a less essential role in resolving informational problems. In
the information model, the fact that another landlord is accepting a tenant en-
courages delay, so that the acceptance decisions of distinct landlords are strategic
substitutes rather than strategic complements.
In addition to this theoretical issue, there are practical reasons for viewing
the information channel as the dominant channel in the case of Sixth Avenue. As
we detailed in Section 2 above, the New York Times article contains a variety of
quotes that indicate the great uncertainty concerning whether or not Bed Bath &;
Beyond would succeed, so that there seems to be little doubt but that important
information was released by its apparent success. In addition, the stores that have
decided to locate in the area are very different from one another, so that it appears
unlikely that the direct crowd effects are large. It is not obvious that the same
shoppers who buy at Bed Bath Sz Beyond will at the same time buy books from
Barnes and Noble.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a theory of search with information externalities, and
have shown how this may help account for the regeneration of Sixth Avenue in the
middle of a recession. In qualitative terms, the key assumption is that the first
store that makes the costly decision to locate must do so without knowing the
level of some market level risk, and that their act of locating will help to reveal
this to those who have waited. The end result is an incentive for all to free ride
off the decisions of someone more anxious to locate than themselves.
We feel that similar forces are at work in the many markets in which there are
changes over time in the optimal pattern of usage of given resources, and in which
there are costs of moving the resources between uses. This makes it important
to explore the applicability of analogous frameworks in the labor market and the
capital market as well as the property market. At an even broader level, the model
points to the importance of learning from the actions of others in the process of
search and adjustment. We have argued elsewhere that such patterns of learning
are pervasive in many markets (see Caplin and Leahy [1993c]), and we are actively
exploring these issues in a variety of different settings.
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